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Empathy, as affective ethical technology 
and transformative political praxis 
 
Elisabeth Kirtsoglou & Dimitrios Theodossopoulos 
 
 
In this essay we re-assess some of the analytical potential of the concept of 
‘empathy’, and in particular, the concept’s ability to address the tension between a 
humanitarian ethos (seen as representative of normative, often conservative values) 
and grassroots political action, which is expressed as solidarity towards troubled 
Others. We invite the reader to join us in a journey that unites ideas from seemingly 
disparate thinkers—philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists—in an attempt to 
salvage empathy from the semantic nexus of pity, compassion, sympathy and related 
sentiments that form the basis of humanitarian antipolitics (Tiktin 2011). We argue 
that empathy, despite its mistaken association with neoliberalism, can be used as a 
politically nuanced analytical notion that has the potential to subvert power, and 
play a role as an affective, ethical technology of resistance. 
 One of our main aims is to stress the value of ‘empathy’ as a conceptual tool 
that can potentially evade typologies of humanitarian action conceived as either 
‘moral code’ or ‘moral agency’ (see Fassin 2014). The empathetic point of view 
triggers an auto-didactic and transformative process of sharing—knowledge, 
perspectives, resources—that has the potential to destabilise fixed 
conceptualisations of social structure and subjectivity. Borrowing inspiration from 
Kastoriadis (2007), we entertain the possibility that the empathic capacity to teach 
oneself how to imagine the world from the Other’s point of view can be seen as 
affirmative political praxis established in radical imagination.  
 In a recent monograph, Carolyn Pedwell has foregrounded empathy as a 
socio-political relation that arises within (but also reconstitutes) ‘social and geo-
political hierarchies and relations of power’ (2014: xii). We share her concern with 
what we call—paraphrasing (Hannerz 2010)—the two faces of empathy: the happy 
and the worried one. The first can be seen as a self-congratulatory attitude on the 
part of the relatively privileged empathiser, while the second reflects distress about 
the asymmetries in humanitarianism and the practice of giving. Pedwell, for sure, 
goes at great length to highlight the neoliberal entanglements of empathy. For 
example, the manner in which empathy has been appropriated by Barack Obama’s 
election campaign (Pedwell 2012a, 2014), or the de-politicisation it propagates in the 
context of international aid and development (Pedwell 2012b, 2014; see also, Fassin 
et al 2010; Fassin 2005, 2011a, 2011b; Ferguson 1994; Povinelli 2011; Cheliotis 2013; 
Rozakou 2012).  
 Such thoughts lead us to interrogate if empathy merely conveys the self-
transformation of the privileged subject, the empathiser, or engenders the potential 
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of transformative political action (that challenges established asymmetries). To 
contemplate the second possibility, Pedwell (2014) uses the work of feminist and 
anti-racist theorists (Ahmed, Spelman). We draw instead our inspiration from 
philosophers (Nitzsche, Levinas, Deleuze, and Castoriadis) and anthropologists 
(Hollan, Throop, Fassin and Rosaldo). We also provide brief examples from the 
austerity and refugee crises in Greece, which indicate how empathy may 
encapsulate humanitarian perspectives that depart from neoliberal humanitarian 
ethnics. 
 
Empathy as an anthropological concern 
We should make visible from the start our intention to defend the usefulness of 
empathy as a political tour de force that will enrich the anthropological analytical 
vocabulary. The crisis of neoliberal capitalism, exemplified in the spread and 
escalation of international conflict, forced displacement and global hierarchies of 
power has intensified anthropological concern about humanitarian action, 
intervention and responsibility. We can see the emergence of a politico-ethical 
doctrine (see Kapferer this volume) whose relation to advanced capitalism does not 
seem to be a matter of pure of historical coincidence. The failures and distortions of 
advanced capitalism have been increasingly portrayed as ‘crises’. The use of the term 
‘crisis’ is itself a technology of governance that serves to solidify this politico-ethical 
doctrine through displacing accountability and through introducing multiple states of 
exception (cf. Agamben 2005) in modern political and economic systems. Successive 
financial crises for example are never discussed in terms of economic implosions and 
the proliferation of casino capitalism (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). Instead, 
there is a systematic attempt to incriminate labour rights and the welfare state and 
to introduce ‘exceptional’ measures that involve the methodical modification of 
employment laws and the abolishment of welfare systems.  
 Forced displacement—another phenomenon that has been described as a 
‘crisis’—is being discursively divorced from military interventions (Kapferer 2004) 
and historical relations of economic violence that date back to colonial times.  
Artificial dichotomies between ‘refugees’ and ‘economic migrants’ attempt to 
establish multiple hierarchies of eligibility, states of exception and ideas about the 
radical difference between the ‘ordered’, ‘advanced’, ‘secular’ and democratic West 
and its troubled Others (cf. Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2016). In this political and—
dare we say ideological—climate, we insist that empathy, the ability to imagine the 
world from the Other’s point of view, may be a useful tool that has the potential to 
question the discursive and practical basis of this new politico-ethical doctrine, 
through inspiring actors to acknowledge the commonality of their political 
predicaments.   
Seen within a broader context of humanitarian de-politicisation, empathy has 
been ignored (at best) by sociocultural anthropologists, or treated—along with other 
sympathy-related concepts—as representing complicity to the status quo. In political 
rhetoric, humanitarian aid directed towards displacement and austerity ‘crises’ has 
played an exonerating role, diverting attention from the foci of power and the 
violence of inequality (see Fassin & Pandolfi 2010). Neoliberal governance literally 
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depends on the idea that it is the responsibility of the third sector, and of ordinary 
citizens, to absorb the shock waves produced by “integrated world capitalism” 
(Guattari 2000). The political ramifications of certain “cultural tropes” such as 
engagement and participation (cf. Candea et.al. 2015) have led a number of scholars 
to closely scrutinise the foundations of the ethical modalities that underpin such 
concepts.  
Standing in unison with voices that challenge the foundations and effects of 
conventional political praxis, and in line with the critical perspective introduced in 
this volume, we will focus on the semiological and ideological divide that separates 
empathy from other compassion-related concepts, and emphasise the role of 
empathy as an ethical technology. Empathy, we feel, can serve as a versatile and 
politically nuanced concept to aid analysis within the expanding fields of political 
anthropology of humanitarianism and moral anthropology. It is, in fact, quite 
surprising that anthropology, a comparative discipline deeply concerned with other 
points of view, has spent so little attention to it (Hollan and Throop 2008, 2011; 
Hollan 2008; Throop 2008). In our view, this inattention is related to a semantic 
confusion regarding the polysemy, cultural variation and specificity of the 
empathetic point view, which is, in turn, further conflated with the empathetic 
projections of the analyst, and the independent trajectory of empathy (as an 
analytical, philosophical and deeply political concept). 
Hollan and Throop have made a significant contribution in advocating for the 
reinstatement of empathy within general contemporary anthropology. In their 
introductions to two collaborative projects (Hollan and Throop 2008, 2011) they 
recognise an anthropological ambivalence towards empathy, dated back to Boaz, 
and exacerbated by Geertz. The latter, in his famous essay ‘From the Native’s Point 
of View’ caricatures the empathetic ethnographer—‘the chameleon fieldworker … a 
walking miracle of empathy’ (Geertz 1983: 56). His position represents a wider 
anthropological tradition that prioritises ‘the structure and contextual meaning’, 
over the thoughts of other people ‘understood as psychological individuals’ (Robbins 
and Rumsey 2008: 416). For Geertz, ethnographic empathy is a mere projection, the 
presumptuous superimposition of the analyst’s thoughts and experiences on the 
ethnographic subject. Instead of attempting to place the experience of others in 
empathetic terms defined by a Western perception of personhood, Geertz 
recommends that the ethnographer should interpret other experiences in their own 
culturally embedded terms (1983: 59).  
Hollan (2008) compares Geertz’s rejection of empathy with the deeply 
empathetic and experiential approach taken by Rosaldo (1989). In his essay ‘Grief 
and a headhunter’s rage’ Rosaldo makes visible a fundamental dimension of 
empathy: to better understand another’s predicament, you need to experience a 
similar predicament yourself. Here, Rosaldo’s well-known anthropological 
narrative—of how he truly understood Ilongot rage and mourning after the tragic 
death of his wife—demonstrates that empathy relies ‘on personal experiences that 
are homologous to the experiences we are attempting to understand’ (Hollan 2008: 
478-9).  
Rosaldo’s experiential position also highlights the role of emotion in the 
empathetic encounter: in order to understand another, you have to feel like 
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another; an argument that redirects attention to the double dimension of empathy 
as a feeling and a mode of thinking. Hollani brings the two dimensions together by 
stressing how empathy ‘is embedded in an intersubjective encounter that 
necessitates on-going dialogue for its accuracy’ implicating ‘the imaginative and 
emotional capacities’ of the empathiser and the beneficiary of empathy (2008: 487). 
We consider Hollan’s holistic view of empathy as a step in the right dimension, but 
we would like to add to the definitional properties of empathy two important, 
additional dimensions: first, the need to think of empathy not as simply rooted in 
homologous experiences, but as the result of the radical imagination; namely, of the 
ability of subjects to imagine the world from the Other’s point of view, even if they 
cannot gain first-hand experience of this world. This understanding of empathy as 
the quality of the radical imagination prevents the Other from being simply collapsed 
onto the Self and safeguards difference. Second, we should not forget, as Pedwell 
(2014) has argued, that empathy is also a political relation. 
Our primary aim in the remaining part of this essay is to examine empathy, 
not as a feeling, but as a capacity to feel, and learn how to see the world through the 
standpoint of Others. The empathic view entails the potentiality of transformative 
experience exemplified in the ability of social actors to create alternative value 
systems and resist normative moralities. Even if we accept that such alternative 
value systems are not fully developed or articulated, we feel compelled to highlight 
that empathy presents us with an analytical opportunity to renegotiate 
accountability and political causality. This opportunity emerges from separating the 
analytical implications of empathy from its semantic connotations and the moral 
baggage of sympathy and neoliberal humanitarianism.  
 
From sympathy to empathy 
Adam Smith is perhaps one of the earlier thinkers that discussed the phenomenon of 
sympathy as recognition of and identification with the feelings of others. Sympathy, 
according to Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) is the result of a process of 
mirroring by which the Self is able to use her imagination in order to understand 
how the other is feeling in a given situation. Smith’s understanding of sympathy is 
inspired by Hume’s Treatise (1738), but also significantly departs from it, insofar as 
Smith recognises that we can never be at one with the feelings of other people. 
Sympathy as recognition is intimately connected to sociality, which opens the way 
for emplacing ethics in social relations. The problem with Smith, however, arises 
from his idea that morality is ultimately a private and individual project, a framework 
that effects a challenging separation of moral from political life, as he makes 
apparent in the Wealth of Nations (1776).  
Modern critics like Tiktin (2011, 2014) and Fassin (2005; 2007; 2011a; 2011b) 
draw our attention precisely to the separation of the moral from the political, which 
can been seen as a necessary step for launching a healthy critique on humanitarian 
antipolitics (cf. Tiktin 2011). Most of the poststructuralist tradition in fact has sought 
to reunite ethical and political concerns both in terms of their respective origins, and 
with regards to their joint effects (see for example, Foucault 2008; Arendt 1958, 
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1963; Agamben 1998; Deleuze 1994; Deleuze and Guattari 1988; Derrida 2001; 
Levinas 1991, 1999; Braidotti 2012).  
The driving intellectual force behind a number of poststructuralist works on 
the political implications of ethical doctrines has been undoubtedly the work of 
Nietzsche—most prominently exemplified in Human All too Human, Beyond Good 
and Evil, and Thus Said Zarathustra. Nietzsche’s contribution to our understanding of 
ethics is of paramount importance with regards to three specific but interrelated 
points: (a) the relationship between ethics and morality, (b) the potentially 
problematic dimensions of moral sentiments, and (c) the role of imagination, 
creativity and transformation. For Nietzsche there is no such thing as universal 
morality. The Nietzschean subject is not constrained by established moral codes but 
is able to use her imagination in order to self-assertively create ethical values in a 
constant effort to transform negative emotions into a positive life force. Sentiments, 
such as pity, sympathy or compassion, are regarded by Nietzsche, not only as signs 
of weakness, but also, and perhaps most importantly, as profoundly self-driven and 
condescending. The foundations of compassion are to be found in feelings of 
superiority vis-à-vis the recipient, who is effectively denied the opportunity to 
exercise her agency and becomes locked in an asymmetrical power relationship. 
Nietzsche’s suspicion towards compassion greatly resembles Marx’s or Oscar Wilde’s 
(2001) classic aversion towards philanthropy.ii 
Even the most careful reading of Nietzsche, however, cannot resolve the 
semantic ambiguity that emerges from the translation of concepts addressing a 
concern for the predicament of others. When speaking of compassion Nietzsche 
employs the term Mitleid, which can be understood as compassion, sympathy or 
pity. The indeterminacy of translation here forces us to both accept Nietzsche’s 
conclusions and to radically differentiate our perspective from his. The range of 
emotions that spring out of human sociality is diverse, and while we agree that 
Mitleid understood as sympathy and pity has depoliticising and denigrating qualities, 
we claim that Nietzsche’s concept of Mitleid is radically different from our 
understanding of empathy, which stems from an eclectic synthesis of Levinas, 
Castoriadis and the explicitly Deleuzian tradition of nomadic ethics as epitomised in 
the work of Rosi Braidotti (2012).  
The term empathy started its intellectual life as a mal-adaptation of the 
ancient Greek term empathis (εμπαθής, passionate). Lotze (1899) used the Greek 
word as a basis for the German term Einfühlung—‘feeling into’, originally coined by 
Lipps (1906; cf. Throop 2008: 403)—which was finally translated by Titchener (1909) 
into English as empathy (cf. Barrett-Lennard 1981; 1997; Vischer 1994; Mallgrave 
and Ikonomou 1994). Successive and unsuccessful translations have not helped 
clarify the differences between empathy, sympathy, compassion or pity. As Engelen 
and Röttger-Rössler note, pity and sympathy are most likely to occur toward persons 
one is related to or who belong to one’s own ingroup, but less often towards 
outgroup members’ who are perceived with suspicion (2012: 4). If we wanted to be 
absolutely clear about the difference between empathy and all other sympathy-
related terms we would have to adopt additional terminological clarifications 
(drawing from Greek concepts, according to the philosophical tradition): perhaps, 
enthymisis (to partake to someone else’s feelings), or katanoisis (which is more akin 
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to the English term understanding). Nevertheless, Okam’s razor commands that we 
endeavour to salvage empathy, instead of adding on the perplexity of existing terms.  
Let us therefore state once more that empathy is not about sympathy, and 
that it is radically different from pity or compassion. Strictly speaking, empathy is not 
a sentiment or emotion, but an affective capacity, more akin to Spinoza’s potentia 
(Braidotti 2012: 183). With a node to Malinowski—as our concern here is to 
reformulate the concept for anthropological use—we conceptualise empathy as a 
process that entails a desire and the capacity to adopt another point of view. But in 
contrast to Geertz (1983), we don’t see empathy as a mere exercise of interpretation 
(of another’s view), but rather as an experiential concept (Rosaldo 1989), which 
‘emerges in an intersubjective field’ (Hollan and Throop 2008: 393; Hollan 2008). The 
capacity to empathise with an Other is not single-handedly empirical, cognitive or 
affective, but encompasses all the aforementioned faculties, and is embedded in 
socio-political relationships (Pedwell 2014).  
Empathy as immanent potentia can only be exhibited by a subject that is 
embodied and embedded in a rhizomatic web of relations (Deleuze and Guattari 
1988; cf. Braidotti 2012: 174-175), by an agent-cum-patient (Carrithers 2005; cf. 
Lienhardt 1961) who affects as much as she is affected by human and non-human 
others. Materiality and embodiment are crucial in this process that is elegantly 
described by Levinas as an epiphany caused by the Other’s face. Facing the Other 
creates responsibility, which is understood by Levinas as a form of recognition that is 
constitutive of social relationships (1991: xix). Unlike Levinas’s understanding of the 
effects of this epiphany, however, the notion of empathy that we propose does not 
efface the difference between the Self and the Other. Furthermore, it does not only 
emerge in the context of pain and vulnerability, but often represents a wider 
predisposition in life—for example, a politically inspired position that attempts to 
subvert the asymmetry of the provider-beneficiary relationship.  
Fifteen years ago, Vassos Argyrou (2002) produced a profoundly insightful 
post-colonial critique of the postmodern turn in anthropological practice. In 
Anthropology and the Will to Meaning, Argyrou (2002) demonstrates how the 
driving force of much ethnographic work had been an ethic of ‘salvation’ by which 
the Self and the Other were deemed to be equal, yet presented as being the same. 
To resolve the emerging paradox, we need at this point to take some inspiration 
from Levinas. Empathy implies responsibility and, as Levinas claims, a certain degree 
of accountability as well. For Levinas, identification with the Other holds the Self 
“hostage” and “accountable for what one did not do, accountable for the others 
before the others” (Levinas 1991: xxix).  
Accountability—stemming out of the realisation of the profound inequalities 
between the anthropologist and many of his informants and the historical routes 
and dimensions of those inequalities (Wolf 1982)—led many postmodern 
ethnographers to resort to redemption tactics (Argyrou 2002). Argyrou explains how 
anthropological analysis systematically attempted to locate the Other in the Self, or 
the Self in the Other, until the two parties proved to share a soothing sameness. We 
believe that the notion of empathy provides us with an opportunity to ease, if not to 
resolve, this tension. As we will demonstrate in the following section, empathy 
entails the capacity of teaching ourselves how to relate to another’s perspective, yet 
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without becoming the same as the Other. In this respect, the empathetic point of 
view destabilises the idea of radical alterity (cf. Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2016). 
  
 
Empathy as radical imagination; or how to teach yourself the Other’s experience 
We have put forward the claim that empathy, as affirmative political praxis and as 
transformative, affective ethical technology can potentially subvert and has the 
possibility of deconstructing narratives of radical alterity, while still respecting 
difference. This claim poses a theoretical problem. If subjects are not under the 
illusion that are essentially the same, how is it possible to claim to understand how a 
given condition makes others feel? How can we avoid both moral and cognitive 
relativism, analytical projections, and a tantalising sense of incommensurability? We 
have partly answered this question already by claiming that the empathic subject is 
always in the process of becoming; an intersubjectively constituted part of relational 
rhizomes; ‘in ongoing dialog’ (Hollan 2008: 475) with others. The permeable, 
multiply composed subject who experiences life as an open-ended process does not 
allow enough room for incommensurability. The problem posed by other 
commensurable minds is an artificial one, if those other minds are not regarded as 
clearly delineated entities, but as parts of webs of relationships.  
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A processual, relational understanding of subjectivity however, does not 
preclude the importance of instances of asynchronicity; it does not entirely solve (or 
safeguard) the question of difference. Empathy as affective recognition of the 
Other’s circumstances and feelings is difficult to explain if we conceive of subjects as 
socially and culturally constructed beings with different experiences, historicities and 
positionalities. How do we empathise with the Other without causing subjectivities 
to collapse onto each other, and how do we indeed empathise with others who 
nominally belong to the same community with us without relying on an essentialist 
conceptualisation of community? How can we understand empathy as an open 
ecology (Guattari 2000) of human relations to the non-human environment? In order 
to answer these significant questions, we draw inspiration from the work of 
Castoriadis, and more specifically from his book Figures of the Thinkable (2007).  
Castoriadis (2007) is reading Sophocles’ Antigone and specifically the excerpt 
known in the Anglo-Saxon world as Ode to Man. Ode is devoted to Anthropos (the 
human being), who is, according to Sophocles, the most formidable, amazing, 
achievement-capable entity. A number of characteristics and human 
accomplishments are listed in thirty-one verses praising human inventions and 
explaining the resourcefulness of Anthropos who knows only death as the limit of 
one’s creativity. One particular verse, however, which describes how humans taught 
themselves to speak—creating thus, language—is especially perplexing. How can 
one teach (oneself) something she does not already know? Anthropos, Castoriadis 
argues, “creates himself as creator in a circle whose apparently vicious logic reveals 
its ontological primacy” (2007: 16). In order to deepen our understanding of 
empathy we will borrow from Castoriadis the emphasis on the capacity to be an 
autodidact, and the concept of vis formandi, the power of creation, the ability to 
create, to form, to imagine and to invent (2007).  
According to Castoriadis’ formulation, the subject’s capacity for empathy 
rests upon (and attests to) the existence of vis formandi, expressed in this instance 
as the ability to imagine how the Other’s world may feel like. The presence of the 
Other—her joy, bereavement, happiness or pain, strength or vulnerability, 
abundance or need—invites the Self to initiate a process of autodidaxis, that is, a 
process of teaching oneself how to cope (with new conditions, including the 
presence and predicament of the Other). We can therefore feel (and see, 
understand, experience) the world from the Other’s point of view, not because the 
Self and the Other are fundamentally the same, but because they are uniquely 
capable of becoming autodidacts in each other’s experiences, as well as learn from 
one another. This process of creating (instituting) and sharing knowledge makes 
empathy an equally cognitive and affective process between embodied subjects 
capable of transforming their world; or, creating by means of their imagination, 
where imagination is social practice (Appadurai 1996), –scapes of empathy.  
Creativity, originality and invention emerge as effects of the radical 
imagination, the capacity to produce de novo (but not necessarily ex nihilo) original 
figurations (Kirtsoglou 2004; 2010; Braidotti 2002: 133; also see Bruner 1993, Hallam 
and Ingold 2007). Empathy cannot be understood separately from the faculty of 
radical imagination; not only because of the stumble of incommensurability, or the 
need to safeguard difference, but also, and perhaps most importantly, because 
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radical imagination allows us to understand how empathy establishes an open 
relationship between living things and their environments, and can be extended 
beyond the human community.   
 
Empathy in times of crisis: an affective technology of resistance 
It will be helpful at this point to provide two examples that illustrate the relevance of 
empathy as an analytical concept that motivates radical imagination from the 
grassroots. The two particular cases we briefly discuss provide us with an 
opportunity to reveal, reflexively, the circumstances that inspired us to reconsider 
the importance of empathy, and our insistence to separate the empathetic approach 
from other sympathy-related perspectives. Both examples emerged in austerity-
ridden Greece. As a response to austerity policies—implemented as an alleged 
remedy to the financial ‘crisis’, post-2010—we have seen the emergence of 
spontaneous empathetic initiatives led by ordinary citizens, who engaged in acts of 
solidarity, aiming to alleviate the predicament of suddenly impoverished citizens, 
and more recently, forcibly displaced persons who attempt to enter the European 
Union. 
 Our first example takes us to the vibrant social context of the Greek anti-
austerity solidarity movement. The term ‘solidarity’ (allilegíi)—which has roots in 
radical political thinking (Rakopoulos 2016)—has been widely adopted by left-
leaning humanitarian initiatives, several of which emerged spontaneously at the 
local level, as groups of citizens came together to provide help to fellow-citizens 
afflicted by austerity. Since the first years of the crisis, spontaneous, informal groups 
of solidarians have worked together to provide dry, fresh or cooked food to 
impoverished families, but also psychological care and legal advice. Institutionalised 
sources of citizen-support—municipalities, NGOs, the church—complemented the 
local humanitarian landscape, by maintaining food-, cloth- and medicine-banks. Very 
interestingly, and as recent anthropological work has documented (Cabot 2014, 
2016; Rozakou 2016a, 2016b; Theodossopoulos 2016), the overwhelming majority of 
participants to humanitarian initiativesiii maintain an aversion towards the notions of 
philanthropy and charity, and a clear preference for the term ‘solidarity’, a more 
politically-conscious alternative (Rakopoulos 2015, 2016; Theodossopoulos 2016), 
which resonates more closely with the empathetic approach. 
 A cynical observer could easily argue that the emphasis on the notion of 
‘solidarity’ in the Greek context is merely rhetorical, a superficial replacement of the 
terms ‘charity’ and ‘humanitarianism’. Yet, as an emerging body of ethnographic 
work has shown (Bakalaki 2008; Rozakou 2012, 2016a, 2016b; Cabot 2014, 2016; 
Rakopoulos 2014a, 2014b, 2015 2016), the choice of words here has a political 
significance; it captures the desire of situated local actors to resist austerity 
(Theodossopoulos 2016). Voluntary work dedicated to the provision of food for 
impoverished fellow citizens is seen by solidarity volunteers as a conscious political 
standpoint, which conveys a message of defiance towards austerity: ‘we will not 
passively accept the imposition of austerity rules’, have said some of the volunteers, 
‘we will not stay inert, when our neighbour next door is suffering’. As individual 
citizens come together to participate in humanitarian solidarity initiatives, they 
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reconstitute their local community, creating networks of support, which can be used 
as loci of political action beyond humanitarianism. Through working together in 
solidarity—explain many volunteers—we learn to rely on our fellow citizen (see 
Theodossopoulos 2016).  
And here lies empathy’s empowering and auto-didactic dimension. Through 
bonding in precarity—here caring for the fellow human—groups of solidarians 
realize the politically enabling dimension of cooperation: they learn from one 
another and from each other’s experience. In a wider sense, they have taught 
themselves how to work together to help others, and through working together to 
defy the demoralising shadow of austerity. The political connotations of this 
rediscovery of ‘Self and local community’—engendered through working with and 
learning from others (while attending the needs of the Other)—cannot be described 
in apolitical ‘sympathy’-related terms. The deeper political message of the grass 
root, solidarity initiatives in Greece was one of the reasons that encouraged us to 
reconstitute—and in this process, de-neoliberalise—the notion of ‘empathy’ as an 
ethnical and political technology. 
 Words here, and their culturally or politically embedded meaning, are of 
importance. In as much as ‘empathy’ is not equal to ‘sympathy’, philanthropic 
activity is not the same as solidarity. Repeatedly, the asymmetrical implications of 
giving create a burden that local actors attempt to overcome. In Greece, the sociality 
of hospitality (see Herzfeld 1987, 1992; Papataxiarchis 2006, 2014; Rosakou 2012; 
Cabot 2014) is often contrasted to the inequality of gift giving, which establishes 
hierarchies (Herzfeld 1992; Hirschon 1992, 2000; Gkintidis 2014). In the everyday 
sociality of humanitarian activity, such semiological distinctions matter: they carry 
political weight, and help define one’s position regarding the ethics of giving (see 
Theodossopoulos 2016). 
   Our second example shows that a short empathetic distance separates the 
demoralising and antisocial consequences of austerity—being yourself suddenly 
impoverished—from the fate of refugees/migrants who have been forcibly displaced 
from their homes either because of protracted war and conflict, or because of 
conditions of economic violence that results in a profound “loss of control over one’s 
life situation” (Graeber 2014: 76).  
 A large number of Greek citizens experienced the arrival of displaced persons 
in their austerity-ridden country as a condition of multitemporality (cf. Knight 2013, 
2015), where past and present experiences of wars, famines, destitution, and 
geopolitical dependence wove themselves in the same messy collective narrative (cf. 
Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2016). In particular, many Greek citizens saw the 
predicament of the refugees (who struggled to cross the Aegean sea) as mirroring 
the experience of their forcibly displaced grandparents who had crossed that same 
sea in 1922. Prosfygiá (refugeeness) as collective narrative (cf. Hirschon 1989; 
Tsimouris 1998) and transgenerational trauma (cf. Anastasiadis 2012) has become 
for a large part of Greek society a mechanism of substitution—in the way in which 
Levinas (1981) has talked about the process of putting oneself in the place of 
another.  A number of people identified with the stranger as another human being- 
in-need, here, conceived as similar to the Self. Encounters with refugees encouraged 
many Greek citizens to establish an empathetic connection that should not to be 
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confused with compassion, pity, or sympathy—any of which can effectively displace 
the recognition of social and political rights (Fassin 2005; Rozakou 2012).  
Empathy, in most of its vernacular Greek articulations, related to the 
recognition that both the Self and the other Exist in similar conditions of precarity, 
alterity, and tantalizing ambiguity. One’s subjective position—of relative safety—
proved to be a matter of luck, rather than the effect of righteous choices (as the 
politico-ethical doctrine of capitalism would urge us to think). The realization that 
precarity affects both the Self and the Other constitutes perhaps the most important 
demystification that can take place in contemporary times. Empathy as identification 
can transform precariousness into an idiom of resistance, crashing the concept of 
‘radical alterity’ as a foundation myth of capitalist modernity (cf. Kritsoglou and 
Tsimouris 2016).  
Although no one can deny the existence of Nazi re-activism, nationalism, 
xenophobia, and racism in Greek public culture, an unprecedented number of Greek 
citizens reacted to the arrival of displaced persons expressing their conviction that 
“today it is them (who find themselves in this situation), tomorrow it might be us”. 
The capacity to imagine circumstances of war, conflict, lack of safety and the ability 
to work and prosper in one’s own country was facilitated by analogical thinking (cf. 
Sutton 1998) that led people to consider past historical events and to proclaim that 
“we are all migrants” and “we are all refugees”.  As Maria, a 45 year-old woman told 
us:  
When you see these people coming out of the boats, it feels like a thousand eyes are 
looking at you. Their eyes, the eyes of your dead grandparents, the eyes of your 
children, the eyes of the unborn who will be reading about these events one day in 
their history books. A thousand eyes, a million eyes, looking at you, asking you: 
“what are you going to do?” When I was learning about the Holocaust, or listening 
to my grandmother’s story of being a refugee, I kept asking myself: What were other 
people doing? Why no one tried to do something? I cannot bear the thought of 
future generations thinking of us as having turned the other way. The sea has a 
thousand eyes and they all stare at us with a question: “what are you going to do?”  
In an explicitly Levinasian fashion, Maria transforms the ethical into an 
explicitly political stance. The need to demonstrate solidarity towards the Other, 
does not come as a result of pity or sympathy, but as the effect of empathy as 
identification that bears two important realisations: first the understanding that 
everyone and anyone (regardless of race, colour, religion, historical timing, effort 
invested) can find themselves in conditions of precarity, uncertainty and need. 
Second, that everyone and anyone (as a result of the above) has a political duty to 
act towards the alleviation of the Other’s predicament. In the scape of empathy the 
Self and the Other become connected in a non-hierarchical fashion, since all 




We are concerned with—but also inspired by—the ambiguity generated by empathy. 
Its happy face is often taken for granted—for example as unquestionably good 
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(Pedwell 2012a: 281)—a moralising apology for neoliberalism’s inequalities. Such an 
un-deconstructed view may encourage projections, the assumption that we act for 
the benefit of others, and that we know what is good for the Other. Here, the 
empathic projection may very well represent the wishes (or subject-position) of 
privileged parties—for example, the ethnographer (Geertz 1983), or the provider of 
aid (Pedwell 2014, Spelman 1997). We see this type of empathy as sympathy in 
disguise.  
 Our concern for the happy, un-deconstructed face of empathy encourages 
attention to the asymmetries generated (or, more often concealed) by humanitarian 
projects, and the neoliberal morality that often sustains them (de Waal 1997, Fassin 
& Pandolfi 2010, Fassin 2011a, Muehlebach 2012; Kapferer this volume). Critical 
engagement with such apolitical empathetic views, encourages us to acknowledge 
that empathy’s happy and worried faces are two aspects of the same coin: it is 
unrealistic to assume that a complete break from neoliberal influences (and 
empathic self-justifications) may be, in fact, possible. The dichotomy between a 
good and a bad empathy, argues Pedwell (2012b: 174), is artificial. Nevertheless, we 
strongly feel, it is important to foreground this problematic: the dialectic between 
empathy’s happy and worried face, inspires the re-politicisation of the concept. By 
making visible the neoliberal entanglements of empathy (for example, as 
humanitarian practice), we open the way for re-evaluating its role as a politically 
nuanced, anti-hierarchical and transformative notion, which addresses an emerging 
theoretical, but also, grass-root demand to differentiate humanitarianism from the 
neoliberal project. 
 In fact, empathy’s emancipatory potential as a political project lies in its very 
distinction from humanitarian sympathy. Where sympathy is laden with 
asymmetrical connotations, empathy engenders the possibility of teaching ourselves 
how to connect with Others without subscribing to neoliberal morality. For example, 
many situated activists in crisis-afflicted Greece argue that philanthropy (inspired by 
sympathy) should not be equated to humanitarian solidarity initiatives (motivated by 
anti-hierarchical empathy) (see Cabot 2016, Rakopoulos 2016, Rozakou 2016, 
Theodossopoulos 2016). Empathy as identification is crucially antithetical to 
neoliberal values since it questions the idea that there is a way out of precarity 
based on one’s hard work and righteous life-choices. It follows then, that it is also 
antithetical to philanthropy, which rests on the conceptualisation of the Self as being 
in a safely better position vis-à-vis the Other.   
 Our commitment to stress the political dimension of empathy—as a political 
relation (Pedwell 2014)—in addition to its intersubjective and affective dimensions 
(Holland & Throop 2008, 2011), has led us to Nietzsche and Castoriadis. Nietzsche’s 
vision of existence as a continual becoming, and his circular treatment of time 
(Kapferer 2014) are at the core of an anti-normative, anti-hierarchical 
conceptualisation of empathy: the recognition that the pain of the Other can be—in 
a non-linear world of changing possibilities—your pain. While Castoriadis’s 
transformative emphasis on our autodidactic potential can help us explain how we 
transcend, some times, the fundamental barrier of being Other, without projecting—
as Geertz would have said—our experience on Otherness. The emancipatory 
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potential of empathy relies on our capacity, not to become Other, but to teach 
ourselves how to relate to each other’s predicaments. 
The question of difference—conceived in socio-cultural terms—is of crucial 
importance here. Empathy has the potential to challenge perceptions and 
representations of radical alterity, and this is precisely why it is an ethical-cum-
political technology. In our capacity to feel the world from the Other’s point of view, 
we are also capable of identifying our common political ground; we are capable of 
not just understanding, but also bonding in precarity. This process is drastically 
different from attempts to eradicate or downplay our differences. Identification with 
others does not happen at the level of persons—e.g.  individual Vs dividual—but on 
the basis that different persons are sharing a common status; in fact, it is our shared 
status—primarily with respect to precarity—that produces an affective response.iv 
The face of the Other hold us accountable in the Levinasean sense. Additionally—
and perhaps most importantly—it provides a cue to the Other’s feelings vis-à-vis 
some given limitation and an insight to the Other’s abilities to overcome these 
limitations. 
 Recognition of the predicament of the Others is thus revealed to be a 
complex, multifarious process that is not exhausted in the politics of compassion 
towards vulnerability. Being vulnerable—disenfranchised, in pain, exposed, or 
unjustly treated—are conditions that can happen to anyone (Rapport 2014). 
Vulnerability can be the predicament of the Other, but also the Self. This 
realisation—epitomised in our respondents in Greece saying ‘today it is you, 
tomorrow it is me’ (símera esí, áurio egó)—is deeply political in its denial of radical 
alterity. For, it views both strength and vulnerability as strictly provisional. The Other 
is not the object of pity for three reasons: first, because her status as vulnerable is 
only circumstantial; second, because under the same circumstances anyone would 
be vulnerable; and third, because the Other is as capable as the Self to fight these 
circumstances. 
In all these possibilities, the Other is not lesser than the Self. Other and Self 
are both part of a “flat”, non-hierarchical ontology (Braidotti 2012: 174). The 
provisionality of the Other’s vulnerability—the realisation that we are all subjects of 
precarity—does not oblige subjects to act morally (although it urges them). It does, 
however, remove hierarchy from the equation. The absence of hierarchy that 
empathy is able to generate is further demonstrated in the fact that the presence of 
the Other encourages the Self to transform from an inward-looking entity to an 
outward looking subject who feels compelled to initiate a relationship. The 
introduction of the Other in the self-evaluation of a certain predicamentv is forcing 
the Self to relate: to create and institute new relationships, to initiate new networks 
and rhizomes of affectivity. In a relationship constituted in empathy, it is difficult to 
distinguish the agent from the patient (Carrithers 2005; Lienhardt 1961; Kirtsoglou 
2010). Both subjects are inter-subjectively constituted in their relationality, 
ultimately dissolving the boundaries between agency and patiency, attesting to the 
constraining and enabling nature of power (Foucault 1978). It is in such terms that 
empathy can be seen (and experienced) as transformative ethical technology of 
affirmative praxis: in the empathetic context subjectivity is an assemblage of forces, 




                                                 
i Drawing inspiration from Jodi Halpern (2001), a professor of bioethics. 
ii See, Marx and Engels 1998, Wilde 2001; and for a discussion of the particular problem, 
Theodossopoulos 2016.  
iii These were primarily volunteers of spontaneous solidarity initiatives, but also a good 
number of employees of institutionalised humanitarian providers, including municipal 
employees (primarily social workers) and Red Cross volunteers (which is not, by all means, a 
left-leaning institution). 
iv In this sense, our notion of empathy is much more inspired by queer politics than moral 
concerns. 
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